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THE QUARTERLY SURVEY

the appellate division, first department, has recently held 3216
unconstitutional in Cohn v. Borchard Affiliations. 2 9
That part of 3216 which the court found invalid, reads as
follows:
The court, either on its own motion or that of a party, may not
dismiss an action for failure to prosecute unless and until issue has
been joined and one year has elapsed, and, further, a notice served
that prosecution is to be resumed and a note of issue served in 45 days.
It was found that the clause, per se, deprives a court of
control over its own calendars, a power long established to be
inherent in a court, and independent of any legislative authorization. The court alluded to the ever-increasing problem of
cases instituted with no intent of going to trial 23 ---thereby
clogging already over-burdened calendars. Thus, it was held
that CPLR 3216, to the extent that it restricts dismissal for
general delay, is unconstitutional. 31
The unconstitutionality of 3216 was hinted at by the Court
of Appeals in Commercial Credit Corp. v. Lafayette, 32 where the
Court avoided the question as unnecessary to determine, but
alluded to "strong support" in regard to its unconstitutionality.3 s
Thus, with Cohn, the controversy over 3216 grows somewhat larger, and becomes ripe for resolution, by the Court of
Appeals.
CPLR 3216: Court holds dismissal "on the merits" will not
preclude interposing same fact in counterclaim or affirmative
defense, because case deemed sui generis.
In a recent case, Headley v. Noto, 3 4 defendant Noto inter-

posed an affirmative defense and counterclaim alleging the same
32930 App. Div. 2d 74, 289 N.Y.S.2d 771 (1st Dep't 1968). The court
reversed special term's denial of defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of
prosecution on the ground that no 45 day notice had been served under
CPLR 3216. Defendant's contention that relief should be afforded despite
its non-compliance with the statute, because the statute was unconstitutional,
was
upheld by the court.
13
OSee Plachte v. Bancroft, Inc., 3 App. Div. 2d 437, 442, 161 N.Y.S.2d
892, 897 (1st Dep't 1957).
13 30 App. Div. 2d at 77, 289 N.Y.S.2d at 775 (lst Dep't 1968). It should
be noted that Presiding Justice Stevents, dissenting, felt that 3216 was merely
a procedural rule, which imposed a "modest" restriction upon the court's
inherent power, and that, this alone was insufficient to render 3216 unconstitutional.
13217 N.Y.2d 367, 218 N.E.2d 272. 271 N.Y.S.2d 212 (1966).
13 For a brief discussion, see 7B McKIxNEY's CPLR 3216, supp. commentary 248, 251 (1965-66).
13422 N.Y.2d 1, 237 N.E.2d 871, 290 N.Y.S.2d 726 (1968).
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facts that he had asserted in a prior action. There, Noto, as
plaintiff, had brought suit under Article 15 of the Real Property
Actions and Proceedings Law' 35 claiming equitable title, under
a contract of sale by a prior owner, to property to which defendants held legal title. That action was dismissed when Noto
failed to appear at trial. His motion to open his default was
granted, but Noto, once again, failed to appear at trial. The trial
court, after taking testimony with respect to his neglect to prosecute,
dismissed the action "on the merits."
In the instant case, special term granted plaintiff's motion
for summary judgment and dismissed Noto's counterclaim on the
grounds of res judicata, since the dismissal of the earlier action
was "on the merits," involved the same parties and sought the
same relief.
The Court of Appeals, however,, reversed and remanded,
stating that under CPLR 3216,136 the trial court has the power
to dispose of a case with prejudice when a plaintiff is shown
to have unreasonably neglected to prosecute it.1 37 Moreover, as
a general rule, where a plaintiff has been dismissed "on the
merits" and is barred from bringing an action or interposing a
counterclaim on the same claim, he is not precluded from asserting
those facts defensively in an action arising out of the same transaction. 138 The Court concluded that this case was sni generis
because the property involved would remain in a state of limbo
by permitting defendant's allegations to remain merely as a
defense, while striking his counterclaim. Legal title could rest
in the hands of one party, and equitable title in the hands of
another.
1-3 Suits brought under this Article are essentially actions for declaratory
judgments to compel the determination of a claim to real property. See
Buell V. Genesee State Park Comm'r, 25 Misc. 2d 841, 206 N.Y.S2d 65
(Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1960); Village of Ossining v. Lahin, 5 Misc. 2d

1024, 160 N.Y.S.2d
1012 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1957).
138 CPLR 32 16(a) provides, inter alia:
"Where a party unreasonably neglects to proceed generally in an
action or otherwise delays in the prosecution thereof . . . the court,
on its own initiative or upon motion, may dismiss the party's pleading
on terms. Unless the order specifies otherwise, the dismissal is not on
the merits."
3
1 7 In Mink v. Keim, 291 N.Y. 300, 52 N.E.2d 444 (1943), the Court
held that under CPA 482, there could be no judgment entered against

plaintiff "on the merits," until the close of the plaintiff's evidence. This
rule has been changed by CPLR 3216, especially in light of the Advisory

Committee's Notes, which clearly indicate that 3216 should not be read
in the same manner as CPA 482. See 4 WEixsTEN , KoRN & MuLE, NNv
YORK CIVIL PRncricF f 3216.15 (1968).
'138The Court analogized this principle with that under CPLR 203(c),
wherein a defense or counterclaim barred by the Statute of Limitations
may be asserted as a set-off, if it arose out of the same transaction which
gave rise to the complaint.
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Judge Breitel, with whom Judge Bergan concurred, dissented on the ground that CPLR 3216 empowered the courts to
dismiss ar action "on the merits," and the effect of the majority
opinion would be to abrogate this power. Moreover, the lower
court's dismissal with prejudice, a fortiori, holds that Noto's
claim is inferior to that of plaintiff. The logical extension of
that proposition, is that Noto cannot now reassert a claim of
title in contradiction to the prior judgment. To allow him to do
so is repugnant to any application of res judicata. Finally, the
dissent reasoned that an affirmance would not leave title to the
property unsettled, because title would be awarded to plaintiffs,
who claim legal title, while defendant's affirmative defenses would
be barred.
It is somewhat confusing why the majority chose to don
this case sui generis, a label which renders the case sterile in
precedental value. On the basis of the reported decision, the
dissent seems to have expounded the preferred view of the law.
Res Judicata: Turisdictional question can be reopened unless based
on litigated question of fact.
The scope of res judicata in questions of subject matter
jurisdiction has rarely been discussed by New York courts.
Ordinarily the issue arises only when a collateral attack is being
made on a foreign judgment, in which case full faith and credit
requires that New York employ the res judicata rule of the
foreign state.1 39 However, in a recent case, Friedman v. State,40
the judgment of the New York Court on the Judiciary 4 was
attacked as having been rendered by an improperly constituted
tribunal.
The claimant, a removed Supreme Court Justice, instituted a
suit to recover his salary. The Court of Claims, dismissed the
claim finding that the judgment of the Court on the Judiciary,
removing claimant from office, was safe from collateral attack.' 42
In so doing, the court relied on the federal court rule, 43 which
grants to every court the power to conclusively determine its own
jurisdiction, subject only to direct review. This decision has recently
been reversed by the appellate division, third department, which
allowed attack under the liberal rule of O'Donoghue v. Boies'4
139Langerman v. Langerman, 303 N.Y. 465, 473-74, 104 N.E2d 857, 861

(1952).

14029 App. Div. 2d 162, 286 N.Y.S.2d 525 (3d Dep't 1968).
1411 ; re Friedman, 12 N.Y.2d [al-[el (Court on the Judiciary 1963).
14253 Misc. 2d 455, 278 N.Y.S.2d 999 (Ct. Cl. 1967).
For a discussion
of this case, see The Quarterly Survey of New York Practice, 42 ST.
JoHxN's L. REv. 436, 461 (1968).
143 Chicot County Drainage District v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371

(1940); Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U.S. 165 (1938).
244159 N.Y. 87, 53 N.E. 537 (1899).

